Involvement of Asian Actors in the European Commission’s Online Consultations in Comparative Perspective by Alexandrova, Petya et al.




Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
http://www.eusanz.org/ANZJES/index.html 
Vol3(2) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
 
Involvement of Asian Actors in the European Commission’s 
Online Consultations in Comparative Perspective 
 
PETYA ALEXANDROVA 













In order to examine the involvement of Asian interests in European Union politics, we develop a 
preliminary framework for studying the involvement of external interests in EU policy -making. Using 
data on the online consultations of the European Commission from 2001 till 2010, we aim at explaining 
both the level of engagement, the types of active actors and policy areas of involvement of different 
regions. We find that that external representation is partly but not fully accounted for by economic ties 
and possession of resources. Moreover, we find variation in which areas and by which actors different 
regions are represented suggesting that variation in national-sectoral structures between them affects 
differences in the character of representation between them. 
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Over the last decades the European Union (EU) has been subject to both broader and 
deeper integration with an increasing amount of jurisdictional powers being transferred 
from the national level to the EU and growing power of supranational bodies and 
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decision-making rules1. The process of legislation drafting in the Union is today open to 
a variety of interests and civil society actors, with the European Commission itself 
fostering a culture of consultation2. The number of interest groups active on EU level 
has gradually increased since the 1970s3. Both this systemic openness and the growing 
activity of the interest group population have attracted academic attention but accounts 
have remained limited to interests stemming from the Union itself, largely ignoring the 
impact of foreign interests. Relations with major trading partners such as Japan and 
China and new forums for cross-regional policy deliberation, such as the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), have been studied primarily (if not exclusively) from an EU-centric 
perspective. Moreover, research on EU cooperation with non-EU countries and other 
regions in the world tends to concentrate on official diplomatic relations and largely 
ignores the role that businesses, interest groups and civil society play in this process. 
This article aims to address the limited knowledge of the involvement of foreign 
interests in EU policy making by undertaking an analysis of the involvement of Asian 
interests in the online consultations of the European Commission from a comparative 
perspective. We focus on Asia since, in recent decades, it has gained increased 
importance in EU trade relations and the world economy in general. To do so, we 
develop a framework for explaining the levels of engagement, the types of active actors 
and policy areas of involvement in different regions, using a dataset covering online 
consultations of the European Commission over the period 2001 – 2010. Online 
consultation is of course only one of many ways in which actors from Asian and other 
non-EU member states may lobby the EU. Our dataset has the advantage of covering a 
broad range of issues over a 10-year period. For this reason it serves as a good starting 
point for looking at Asian engagement, and provides a base to which future research on 
other types of lobbying may contribute. 
Our findings reveal that external representation is partly accounted for by economic ties 
and possession of resources. The most active external actors come from North America, 
extra-EU Europe and Asia, which are also some of the regions that have the highest GDP 
and strongest trade ties with the EU. At the same time, we find limitations to explaining 
external representation based on economic resources alone. Even though Asia is the 
EU‟s leading trade partner and the region with the highest GDP in the world, Asian 
interests are less active than North American and European extra-EU ones. Moreover, 
we find that external actors focus mostly on banking and trade-related issues as well as 
environment and transport and that a high number of the foreign contributions come 
from companies, interest groups and public bodies. Variation in the national-sectoral 
                                                 
1 T. Börzel, „Mind the Gap! European Integration between Level and Scope‟, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 217–236; L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multi-Level Governance and 
European Integration, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 
2 European Commission, Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue – General 
Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 
COM(2002)704, 2002, <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0704:FIN:EN:PDF>, accessed 20 January, 
2011. 
3 J. Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, New York: St Martin‟s Press, 2003; B. 
Kohler-Koch, „Changing Patterns of Interest Intermediation in the European Union‟ Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1994, pp. 166–180. 
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structures of the regions helps us to explain differences in the character of 
representation. 
The article first reviews the literature on the interactions between Asia and the EU and 
interest representation in the EU. The subsequent section is dedicated to outlining in 
more detail the Commission‟s consultation procedures and presenting the data and 
methodology of the study. Finally, our analysis will present a preliminary attempt to 
map the involvement of non-EU interests in online consultations over time.  
Contextualising the EU – Asia Relationship 
 
Trade relations between Asia and the EU have grown in importance over the years. Not 
only has the trade volume between the two regions grown significantly in the last 
decade4, increasing political cooperation has also manifested itself through several 
institutional bodies. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), founded in 1996 encapsulates 
this. Through this institutionalized summit European and Asian leaders come together 
biennially to discuss a diverse range of issues, primary with economic focus5. The 
establishment of ASEM and its subsequent summits have increasingly attracted 
scholarly attention in the field of EU-Asian relations. For instance, Pakpahan6 argues 
that the ASEM could become a powerful institution for promoting inter-regional 
economic cooperation, thereby possibly reversing the global trend of creating secluded 
regional trade zones7. Notably however, Pakpahan‟s study – and in fact many other 
studies exploring this institutional cooperation between the EU and the ASEAN – 
concentrate primarily on the impact of actions of the EU on Asia.8 Single case studies on 
the interactions between the EU and particular Asian countries or sub-regions do not 
broaden the picture of interest representation since such analyses are still limited to the 
level of the state. Recognising China‟s status as a global player, Fox and Godement 
maintain that “decisions taken in Beijing are central to virtually all the EU‟s pressing 
global concerns” and stress that Europe should pay more attention to this fact.9 Yet, it 
has been recognised that non-governmental organisations also play a role in the 
                                                 
4 M. Garcia, „Fears and Strategies: The EU, China and Their Free Trade Agreements in East Asia‟ Journal 
of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2010, pp. 496-513. 
5 C. M. Dent, Economic Relations between the EU and East Asia: Past, Present and Future. 
Intereconomics, Vol. 32, No.1, 1997, pp. 7-13. 
6 B. Pakpahan, „Contemporary Trans-regional Cooperation between Europe and Asia in a Changing 
World‟, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2010, pp. 514-534. 
7 B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, „Theorising the Rise of Regionness‟ New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
2000, pp. 457-472. 
8 D. Camroux, The Rise and Decline of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Asymmetric Bilateralism and 
the Limitations of Interregionalism, 2006, Centre d‟études européennes: Cahiers Européens; Dent, 
Economic Relations between the EU and East Asia: Past, Present and Future, op. cit.; C. M. Dent, „The 
New Economic Bilateralism in Southeast Asia: Region-Convergent or Region-Divergent?‟ International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 81-111; A. Forster, „The European Union in South-
East Asia: Continuity and Change in Turbulent Times‟ International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, 1999, pp. 743-
758; E. Kettunen, 2004, Regionalism and the Geography of Trade Policies in EU-ASEAN Trade, 
Helsinki: Helsinki School of Economics, Electronic Dissertation. 
9 J. Fox and F. Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations. London: European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2009, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/A_Power_Audit_of_EU_China_Relations.pdf>, 
accessed 26 January, 2011, pp. 1. 
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interregional relationships, for example when participating in the ASEM summits.10 
Nevertheless, a high level decision-making arena, ASEM fails to reach out to the most 
relevant publics in Asia, and has a very low profile among business, media and civil 
society elites.11 Therefore, it is logical to expect that organised interests will try to 
promote their interests by lobbying in Brussels directly.  
Studying Representation of Asian Interest in the EU 
Rather than looking at the literature on high-level relations between the EU and Asia 
we, therefore, need to examine how external interests interact with the Union 
institutions in everyday politics. It is precisely in everyday politics that many of the 
issues of concern to Asian interests are reconciled. The literature on interest 
representation in the EU has suggested a prominent role for interest groups in 
channelling the concerns of the citizens to the formal decision-makers.12 Studies have 
focused mostly on particular policy areas, specific institutions or types of groups as well 
as interests stemming from a narrow set of EU member states.13 Besides existing studies 
on Japanese and Korean companies,14 there has been no specific analysis of   the 
involvement of Asian interests in EU policy making. Representation of other extra-EU 
organised interests‟ involvement in the drafting of EU legislation has remained largely 
under researched.  
                                                 
10 D. Camroux, op. cit.; Pakpahan, op. cit. 
11 A. Brovelli, N. Chaban, S. Lai and M. Holland, „Invisible Forum? The Public Outreach of the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM)‟ Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2010, pp. 535-550. 
12 R. Eising, „Interest groups in EU policy-making‟ Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 3, No. 4, 
2008, <http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-4>, accessed  15 January, 2011; J. Gaffney, Political 
Parties and the European Union, London: Routledge, 1996; E. Kirchner and K. Schwaiger, The Role of 
Interest Groups in the European Community, Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1981; Kohler-Koch, op. cit.; 
S. Mazey and J. Richardson, (eds.), Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
13 P. Bouwen, „Exchanging Access Goods for Access: A Comparative Study of Business Lobbying in the 
European Union Institutions‟, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, 2004a, pp. 337-369, P. 
Bouwen, „The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2004b, pp. 473-95; 
J. Beyers, „Gaining and Seeking Access: the European Adaptation of Domestic Interest Associations‟, 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 41, 2002, pp. 585-612; R. Bennet, „The impact of European 
Economic Integration on Business Associations: The UK Case‟, West European Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, 
1997, pp. 61-90; J. Greenwood, J. Grote and C. Ronit, Organized Interests and the European Community, 
London: SAGE, 1992; R. Eising, The Access of Business Interests to the European Union Institutions: 
Notes Towards a Theory, Working Paper no 29, Oslo: Arena Centre for European Studies, 2005; R. 
Eising, „Institutional Context, Organizational Resources and Strategic Choices: Explaining Interest Group 
Access in the European Union‟ European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2007, pp. 329-362; D. Coen, „The 
Evolution of the Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union‟ Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 4, No.1, 1997, pp. 91-108; Bennett op. cit. 
14 Y. Hamada, „The Impact of the Traditional Business-Government Relationship on the Europeanization 
of Japanese Firms‟, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2007, pp. 404-421; Y. Hamada, 
Japanese Firms in the EU: Europeanization of Lobbying Strategies and Enduring National 
Characteristics, Doctoral thesis, University of London and, 2007 and C. R. Pang, „Policy networks and 
multiple lobbying strategies in EU trade policy-making. A Korean perspective‟, Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 
2, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-444 respectively. 
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The general EU interest group literature regarding what conditions the access groups 
enjoy in EU policy making is a departure point for an explorative study of the 
participation of Asian versus other interests in EU policy drafting. However, it needs to 
be acknowledged that this literature was developed in the study of liberal democracies. 
Their models of civil societies do not always appreciate the situation in Asian countries. 
However, some of the overarching insights from this literature are not linked to 
specificities of state-society structures in liberal democracies. Instead, they are 
formulated more generally and can be applied in other settings as well. We therefore 
depart from the overall findings of this literature on access to EU policy making in order 
to develop our framework. Eising15 has summed up these findings by emphasizing that 
access (or the number of contacts interest groups have) depends on resources, political 
opportunities vested in the EU institutional environment and elements of organisational 
structure and national-sectoral embeddedness. Building upon these general ideas we 
suggest that four major factors influence the representation of foreign and in particular 
Asian organised interests in the EU: economic ties to the EU, resources, familiarity with 
EU practices, and fields of interregional cooperation. 
The first factor – economic ties – is derived from the expectation that non-EU actors 
from regions that are mostly affected by EU regulation should be the ones that also have 
the greatest incentive to defend their interests at this policy level. So-called pluralist 
interest group scholars16 have, for a long time, argued that interest representation 
occurs in response to disturbances to the interests of a given actor. As a policy issue 
becomes salient and has a potential impact on the interest of certain groups in the 
society, those groups will mobilize and attempt to influence that policy issue.17 The 
stronger the economic ties between a region and the EU, the greater the likelihood that 
this group will have impact on EU policy making around a specific policy issue. 
Therefore, we assume that the stronger the economic bonds, the higher the likelihood 
for participation in the consultations of the Commission. To determine the economic 
relations of regions with the EU many different indicators could be considered. For 
example, we could examine whether absolute trade levels with the EU or degrees of 
trade interdependence between a country and the EU relative to the rest of the world 
play an important role. We argue in favour of using the absolute level of trade since this 
should act as a driver stimulating a given country to lobby the EU, irrespective of the 
level of trade with other countries. As long as there is something at stake, there should 
be a demand for lobbying activity at the EU level18 Considering the data for 2008 (table 
                                                 
15 R. Eising, The Access of Business Interests to the European Union Institutions: Notes Towards a 
Theory, op. cit. 
16 see for example D. B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political interests and public opinion, New 
York: Knopf, 1951. 
17 see J. A. Caporaso, The Structure and Function of European Integration. Pacific Palisades, California: 
Goodyear Publishing Company, 1974; L. Cram, „The EU Institutions and Collective Action: Constructing a 
European Interest‟ In J. Greenwood and M. Aspinwall (eds.), Collective Action in the European Union: 
Interests and the New Politics of Associability, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 63-80. 
18 Moreover, it should be noted that in spite of our criticism we actually tried calculating the share of EU 
trade out of total trade for our regions. The results showed that for 2008 four of our regions (Asia, 
Australia and Oceania, North America and South America) had the same level of interdependence. In 
other words, we find no systematic variation in interdependence, which can help explain varying levels of 
engagement.  
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1A), it is clear that the majority of EU foreign trade is with Asia, followed consecutively 
by non-EU Europe and North America. Much less trade occurs between the EU and the 
remaining continents. These figures suggest that we should expect Asian organised 
interests to be the most active ones, followed by European extra-EU ones and North 
American interests. We also anticipate little involvement of organised interests 
originating in Africa, South America or Australia.  
 
Table 1. Trade with the EU, by region, sub-region and country (January - 
December 2008) in bln EUR 









Import 158 676 16 438 225 86 
Export 120 446 31 376 298 84 
Total amount of 
trade (Import + 
Export) 
278 1121 45 814 523 170 












Import 21 399 57 79 120 
Export 7 180 50 56 153 
Total amount of 
trade (Import + 
Export) 









India Singe-pore Turkey 
Import 18 248 75  40 29 16 46 
Export 6 78 42  26 32 22 54 
Total amount of 
trade (Import + 
Export) 
24 326 117  65 61 38 110 
* North America includes USA, Canada and Mexico    
Source: European Commission, DG Trade, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics>, accessed 15 January, 2012. 
 
Within Asia – the biggest trade partner region (table 1B) – we can distinguish between 
five geographical sub-regions.19 Half of the EU trade with this continent occurs with 
                                                 
19 We follow the framework of the UN for composition of geographical sub-regions within Asia. The only 
country we exclude here is Cyprus because even though it belongs to Western Asia, it is an EU member 
state since May 2004. 
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Eastern Asia. The second biggest commerce partner here is Western Asia, followed by 
South-Eastern, Southern and only then Central Asia. Therefore, we would expect 
interests originating from Eastern Asia to be the most active in the consultations, 
followed by interests from the other four regions in the enlisted order. Table 1C shows 
the countries which contribute most to the regional trade. When applying the same logic 
of economic ties effect on participation of organised interests, China should be leading 
in interest articulation, followed by Japan and Turkey, all three countries belonging to 
the two biggest trading regions.  
A second factor that might affect the involvement of interests from different regions is 
structural differences between them in terms of the resources actors possess. Interest 
group scholars agree that different types of resources, such as technical expertise, policy 
information, budget and the economic clout of the organizations help groups gain 
access.20 Whereas studies have typically measured the resources of particular 
organizations, it is harder to assess the general strength of interests in terms of 
resources on the macro level. All things being equal, actors from a relatively wealthy 
region are more likely to have a higher command of resources to defend their interests 
at the EU scene than actors from a relatively poor, developing region.  
A very crude measure of organizational strength is the economic prosperity of a region, 
estimated via Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This leaves out cultural, political and 
other societal differences between countries, which also remain relevant for variation in 
levels of participation in EU lobbying. Ideally additional factors, such as the 
development of civil society, political culture, the quality of the educational system, the 
number of companies who could lobby would be considered. However, for some of these 
variables, such as the development of civil society, systematic, comparable data simply 
does not exist on a cross-country basis. For others, some indicators exist. For example, 
we could have used the human development index, which takes education, living 
standards and health, or we could have consulted the World Bank list of registered 
companies in different countries. We have compiled this data, but presenting it here 
would not have altered our findings, since these measures are highly correlated. Finally, 
as we show later, nearly all Asian interests that mobilize in European consultations are 
either companies or business associations. It is exactly these types of groups that make 
up the gross domestic product. Therefore, GDP can be used as a reliable indicator of the 
resource potential of actors from a given economy to act vis-à-vis the EU.  
Table 2A shows that Asia is the region with highest GDP in the world, followed closely 
by North America. Other regions – South America, extra-EU Europe, Africa and 
Australia – have a much lower level of GDP. Thus, linking this factor with the previously 
formulated economic ties, Asia still remains the region which we could expect to 
articulate its interests most strongly. Unlike our economic ties indicator, however, GDP 
                                                 
20 Mazey and Richardson, op. cit.; R. Eising, „Institutional Context, Organizational Resources and 
Strategic Choices: Explaining Interest Group Access in the European Union‟, op. cit. 
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size predicts higher involvement of North American than European non-EU interests. 
The rest of the world is still expected to be less active.21 
 
Table 2. GDP at current prices (2009) in bln US Dollars 











6 1.131 2.431 15.463 3.861  


















India Indonesia Turkey 
GDP* 109 4.984 5.069 833 1.287 540 615 
Source: United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database,  
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp>, accessed 
15 January, 2012.   
 
The ordering of Asian sub-regions (table 2B) also gives almost similar results as „trade 
with the EU,‟ our previous indicator; only Southern and Western Asia are much closer 
now. Therefore, we could still expect Eastern Asia to be the most active part of the 
continent, Central Asia the least active one, while for the rest the level of interest group 
activity should be similar. Looking further within Asia (table 2C), similar countries 
appear to be important in our assumed relationship between interest representation and 
resources as in the one focusing on economic ties. Nevertheless, the order is different 
and if GDP determines the level of involvement of organised interests, we could expect 
Japan and China to be most active, followed by India, Russia, South Korea, Turkey and 
Indonesia on a much lower level.  
A third factor which might have some impact is familiarity with the consultation 
procedure. Socialisation with a particular practice involves both policy learning and 
adaptation, implying that „an agent switches from following the logic of consequences to 
a logic of appropriateness‟22. In other words, it can be expected that organised interests, 
which have already become familiar with the process of presenting their interests, are 
more likely to be involved again. The more familiar an actor becomes with the 
                                                 
21 The ordering of the regions hardly changes if instead of GDP, we use Gross National Income (GNI), only 
the numbers of non-EU Europe and South America become almost the same. 
22 J. T. Checkel, „International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework‟ 
International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2005, pp. 801-826 (p. 804). 
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procedural features of an institutionalised system of interest articulation, the easier it 
becomes to express an opinion. Hence, we expect that in all regions the participation in 
online consultations should increase progressively the longer an actor has engaged 
with it. 
A fourth factor is the national-sectoral structure of the region. The areas a region is 
going to pursue and the types of actors involved will depend on the type of interests and 
strong economic sectors that exist in the countries of the region. It is not easy to collect 
such data on a global basis. Therefore, we have examined whether there is a link 
between the fields in which cooperation between the EU and the region in question 
takes place and looked at the policy areas in which interest representation occurs. The 
EU-Asia Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships from 2001 focuses primarily 
on issues of security, trade and investment, development, democracy and the rule of law 
and environment.23 Similar fields tend to be present in the New Transatlantic Agenda 
with the US, which has been active since 1995.24 In the European non-EU region the 
diversity of cooperation in terms of policy fields is extremely high. Nevertheless, when 
cooperation with the important partners from the European Economic Area is 
considered, strong economic, security, and immigration components can be identified.25 
Thus, following the assumption that cooperation in a particular policy field triggers 
interest mobilisation in this field we could expect that trade- and finance-related 
interests should be highly represented in the Commission consultations for all regions, 
whereas there should be diversity of representation in other policy fields. Finally, the 
level of activity per policy field could be used as an indirect predictor for the types of 
actors that we would expect to be active. Hence, to some extent there might be a linkage 
between an activity in different policy areas and the type of actors that mobilize. If a 
country is very active in foreign policy, public actors might play a prominent role, 
whereas in other types of policies other interests might dominate. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that if trade and finance are attracting participation, then companies and 
specific interest groups could be expected to be contributing most. Before examining 
the validity of these expectations, we first present our data and methodology. 
 
                                                 
23 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, 
COM(2001) 469 final, 2001 
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/strategy_asia_2001_en.pdf>, accessed January 
26, 2011. 
24 European Commission, New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995, 
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf>, accessed 26 January, 2011. 
25 European Free Trade Association, European Economic Area Agreement, 1994, 
<http://www.efta.int/legal-texts/EEA/main-text-of-the-agreement.aspx>, accessed 26 January, 2011; 
European Economic Community, Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss 
Confederation, 1972, <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21972A0722%2803%29:EN:HTML>, accessed 26 
January, 2011. 
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Data and Method 
European Commission consultations are one of the most well-established ways for 
influencing policy documents under preparation. They help the Commission to acquire 
legitimacy by including the voice of civil society and gain expertise thereby ensuring the 
quality of legislation. Consultations can involve all types of societal actors, ranging from 
local governmental bodies to individual citizens and experts. Any initiative that is 
subject to an extended impact assessment is generally open for consultation.26 
Consultations can range from forums or conferences, organised for all interested parties 
or restricted to particular expert groups to online calls to send an opinion regarding a 
proposal. The last – online consultations – are open to any group, organisation or 
individual, including foreign actors, and represent a much cheaper and more accessible 
tool for influencing legislation drafting.27 Calls for such consultations are posted on 
most Commission Directorates‟ (DGs) webpages and generally on the Your Voice in 
Europe website.  
In this article we have used a new dataset on the online consultations from 2001 to 
2010, including information about the policy issues on which consultation took place 
and the actors who participated. Policy areas have been coded following the EU 
codebook of the Comparative Policy Agendas Project28 – an EU version of an 
internationally standardised codebook originating from Baumgartner and Jones‟ 
agenda-setting project.29 Types of actors have been classified in several broad 
categories, namely companies, public bodies, European institutions, private persons, 
interest groups and international organisations. Altogether the dataset includes 
information about 170 consultations in which foreign actors participated with a total of 
877 contributions.30  
Since so little is known about the participation of non-EU interests in EU policy 
drafting, our analysis in this article will remain largely descriptive. We rely mostly on 
crosstabs for assessing whether the four factors identified in the previous section affect 
foreign representation in the online consultations. However, we will also use the Mann-
Whitney‟s U statistic to determine whether different samples of data shown in our 
crosstabs significantly deviate from each other. It is similar to a standard t-test but more 
appropriate here since the data is not measured at an interval level and also not 
necessarily normally distributed.  
                                                 
26 European Commission, Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue – General 
Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, op. cit. 
27 C. Quittkat and B. Finke, 2008, „The EU Commission Consultation Regime‟, in B. Kohler-Koch, D. De 
Bièvre and W. Maloney (eds.),  Opening EU-Governance to Civil Society. Gains and Challenges. 
CONNEX Report Series No 05, Mannheim: CONNEX – Network of Excellence, pp.183-222. 
28 P. Alexandrova, G. Breeman, S. Brouard, M. Carammia, S. Princen, A. Rasmussen and A. Timmermans, 
European Union Agendas Project Codebook, Version 2.0, December 2010. 
29 See <http://www.policyagendas.org/>, accessed 15 January, 2012 and 
<http://www.comparativeagendas.org/>,   accessed 15 January, 2012. 
30 The overall dataset is bigger and includes contributions stemming from the EU as well as truly 
international ones. However, those are not relevant for the present analysis. 
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Asian Organised Interests in a Comparative Perspective  
Regions and States in EU Policy Preparation 
As a first exploration of the data, we assessed the nationality of all actors that were 
involved in the online consultations grouped by continent, as displayed by table 3A. If 
we look at the interests that contributed, neither our prediction based on economic ties 
between regions, nor the one based on GDP is confirmed. We find a relatively equal 
number of actors from North America (especially USA) and European non-EU countries 
(predominantly Norway and Switzerland). Actors from Asia also seek representation at 
the Commission but in considerably smaller numbers than North America and extra-EU 
Europe. 
 








Africa 16 1,82%  Central Asia 1 0,66% 




 Japan 63 42% 
Europe (Non-EU) 267 30,44%  China 18 12% 
North America 418 47,66%  South Korea 12 8% 
South America 9 1,03%  Southern Asia 12 7,95% 
Total 877 100%  India 8 5% 
    South-Eastern Asia 10 6,62% 
    Western Asia 35 23,18% 
    Turkey 19 13% 
    Israel 6 4% 
    Total 151 100% 
 
When we look at the Asian sub-regions, we note that most contributions come from 
Eastern Asia as suggested by the economic ties expectation. Also in line with this 
expectation, a significant degree of participation of Western Asian actors exists and 
much less from Southern, Central and South-Eastern Asia. The involvement of the most 
active region is due to contributions from three states only: Japan, China and South 
Korea (table 3B). These are the three Eastern Asian states with the greatest amount of 
trade amount with the EU. In the second most active region Turkish actors make up for 
more than half of the contributions, while others are coming from a number of other 
countries. In Southern Asia, India is the leading participant, whereas in South-Eastern 
Asia, activity is spread in small portions across five countries. Thus, our expectation that 
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economic ties influence interest activity per region and state in Asia is very much 
supported. The sub-regions and countries with the highest trade amount with the EU 
are indeed the most involved in the Commission‟s consultations.  
Our GDP prediction confirms Eastern Asia as the most active sub-region on the 
continent. The level of participation for all regions corresponds to the ordering in terms 
of GDP. On the country level, Japan is confirmed as the most active Asian state when it 
comes to interest articulation. The same applies generally when considering the other 
countries leading in terms of GDP like China, India, South Korea and Turkey.  
We have already indicated that the expectations based on economic-ties and resources 
alone are not sufficient to explain the level of participation in the European 
Commission‟s online consultations. Other factors undoubtedly play a role in triggering 
interest involvement. Nevertheless, as expected, Africa, South America and Australia are 
not very active in trying to push for their interests on EU level. Moreover, the analysis 
on sub-regional and state level within Asia is to a great extent explained by economic 
ties and GDP. Therefore, even though these arguments do not seem to hold completely 
true in all cases, they should definitely not be rejected. Indeed regions with strong trade 
relationships with the EU and higher GDP levels are more prone to articulate their 
preferences in the phase of policy drafting. However, trade and resources are not the 
only indicators and when comparing the most active regions a more refined explanation 
should also be sought. 
Longitudinal Patterns of Interest Representation 
Figure 1 displays the contributions to consultations per year by the actors in each region. 
Looking at the table bars, we see that the expected rising trend in contributions is 
generally not confirmed for non-EU Europe, North America and Asia, whereas for the 
other continents the numbers are too small to speak of trends. The lower numbers for all 
continents in 2010 are due to the incomplete data for this year and should not be 
interpreted as a drop of the number of contributions.31The total number of consultations 
which received responses by foreign actors increased over the years, as did the number 
of consultations issued by the Commission. To determine the extent to which the rising 
number of foreign contribution is a simple reflection of the higher number of 
consultations per year or indeed results from an increased likelihood that foreign actors 
participate in consultations a control is needed. To achieve this, we divide the total 
number of foreign contributions in a given year by the number of consultations (line in 
figure 1 with scale on the right-hand-side y-axis). This graph shows some fluctuations 
between the individual years, but it is hard to draw straightforward conclusions 
regarding whether familiarity with the procedures contributes to an increased 
involvement of non-EU interests. It is notable that the most active regions – North 
America, extra-EU Europe and Asia – show different trends over time. Asia, in 
particular, had its peak in 2004, dropped in participation in 2005 and since then has 
slightly been increasing. Hence, it does not seem likely that familiarity with the 
procedure has a positive effect on the rising number of contributions in each region. 
Additional explanations have to be sought in order to make sense of the specific trends 
                                                 
31 The year 2001 is not shown in the figure because it contains only one contribution. 
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over time. The exact topics on which the Commission launches consultations for 
example might be a better predictor of the foreign response rate. We turn to this idea in 
the following section.  
Figure 1. Number of contributions per year 
 
 
Organised Interests across Policy Fields 
We now focus on different policy areas that attract participation of interests outside the 
EU, as displayed in Table 4. Note that, although all consultations were coded according 
to the 21 categories, as explained above, we present only those policy areas with a 
sufficient number of active actors.32 As table 4 suggests our expectation that finance- 
and trade-related policies should attract most contributions holds true only for non-EU 
Europe and North America. These fields play a role but do not dominate activity in all 
regions, and in particular for Asia. In terms of policy field of involvement Asia differs 
significantly from both North America and non-EU Europe (p<.05). While North 
American and non-EU European interests seem to prioritise issues of banking and 
financial regulation, Asian actors primarily focus on the environment. Surprisingly, it is 
exactly on environmental issues and transport where Asia scores high in terms of 
participation in the consultations. This interest mobilization is however surprising only 
at a first glance. The prominence of transport may be explained by the role of commerce 
between Asian countries and the EU, since „the essential role of transport in the 
                                                 
32 Only policy fields accounting for more than approximately 10% for Asia are presented. 
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continuation and development of trade between Europe and Asia‟ has been underlined 
in the Strategic Framework for cooperation between the two regions.33 Environmental 
challenges which the EU has to tackle together with its partner Asia are also strongly 
emphasised in this document.34 Finally, science and technology play a role in almost all 
the regions, and scores third when it comes to looking at participation of Asian interests 
specifically. 
A good example of Asian contributions appears the 2005 consultation on the types of 
hazardous substances that should no longer be used in electronic equipment. This 
consultation by Directorate-General Environment is conducted on a regular basis in 
order to allow scientific progress to inform decision-making. As a major producer of 
electronic equipment, many Asian companies had considerable interests to transmit to 
the European policy makers. The Directive on hazardous substances, which is often 
revised on the basis of these consultations, has immediate effects for the position of 
electronic equipment exporting countries in Asia. Another telling example is the 2004 
consultation on the revision of Commission Regulation on exemptions from the 
common market competition rules for certain categories of agreements between 
undertakings in the air transport industry. Half of the foreign contributions sent in this 
online consultation process came from Asian actors.  
Table 4. Contributions per policy area (by continent) 













6,25% 9,27% 12,50% 34,08% 33,25% 11,11% 28,28% 
Transportation 18,75% 17,22% 25,00% 14,23% 11,00% 0,00% 13,34% 
Environment 18,75% 47,68% 37,50% 15,73% 32,30% 22,22% 29,65% 
Science and 
technology 
0,00% 9,93% 12,50% 6,37% 7,66% 11,11% 7,64% 
Foreign trade 12,50% 6,62% 0,00% 1,12% 1,20% 22,22% 2,51% 
Other 43,75% 9,27% 12,50% 28,46% 14,59% 33,33% 18,59% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total Nr. 16 151 16 267 418 9 877 
 
Types of Actors Involved in EU Consultations 
We now turn to considering the differences in types of actors as presented in Table 5. 
The U statistic shows significant differences in actor types between North America and 
Asia (p<.01), whereas non-EU Europe and Asia do not differ significantly. Table 5 shows 
                                                 
33 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, op. cit. 
34 Ibid. 
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that companies represent more than half of the North American actors, some forty per 
cent of the group of Asian interests and only one fourth of the European non-EU actors. 
A closer look at our data reveals that individual companies from all four Asian regions 
contributed substantially to the consultations.  
Table 5. Contributions per types of actors 












Company 56,25% 41,72% 43,75% 26,97% 69,62% 22,22% 50,63% 
Public 18,75% 22,52% 31,25% 48,31% 4,07% 66,67% 22,12% 
Private 
person 0,00% 3,97% 6,25% 4,49% 5,74% 11,11% 5,02% 
Interest 
group 18,75% 30,46% 18,75% 19,48% 19,86% 0,00% 21,32% 
Other or 
unknown 6,25% 1,32% 0,00% 0,75% 0,72% 0,00% 0,91% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total Nr. 16 151 16 267 418 9 877 
 
 
The high number of public actors in some regions, including Asia, warrants more 
attention. We would expect such a pattern for European actors, where the literature 
points to a high involvement of public actors, given that many local or regional 
governments play an active role in the EU policy-making scene.35 Yet, it is less clear to 
what extent this pattern should be present outside the Union. The non-significant result 
of the Mann-Whitney test comparing Asia to extra-EU Europe suggests there might be 
similarities of representation between these regions. A closer look at the data reveals 
that a high number of Asian public actors belongs to Western Asia. Within this sub-
region, more than half of the contributions come from Turkey, and the actors involved 
range from trade to human rights ministries, even including the office of the prime 
minister. Turkey‟s pending EU membership application is probably important here and 
may help to explain the high number of state actors that are active. Turkey has elaborate 
cooperation with the EU in a number of areas. The high number of public contributions 
from non-EU Europe is likely to be an artefact of the close cooperation of these 
countries with the EU within the framework of the European Economic Area.  
In Asia, specific interest groups also tend to be a major group seeking representation. In 
fact, interest groups are more strongly represented here than in all other regions except 
for North America. These come predominantly from Eastern Asia, in particular Japan 
                                                 
35 M. Tatham, With, Without or Against You? The Interest Representation of States and their Sub-State 
Entities in the European Union, PhD Dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2010. 
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and partially South Korea. Just like the companies from these countries, interest groups 
are active on issues of environment and transportation, and to a lesser extent on 
financial issues. This is not surprising, given that almost all Asian interest groups are 
trade or business related.  
 
Conclusion 
So far, EU-Asian relations have been examined predominantly from an EU-centric 
perspective, neglecting the involvement of Asian interests in day-to-day EU policy 
making. This paper has presented an analysis of the representation of Asia in the 
European Commission‟s online consultations in comparative perspective. We derived a 
preliminary framework for examining the involvement of external interests in order to 
understand the level of engagement, the types of active actors and policy areas of 
involvement of different regions. Overall, we see that the strongest predictor of 
participation in EU consultation is the degree of trade links with the EU and the 
absolute resource levels of the countries involved. We also find evidence that differences 
in national-sectoral structures play a role even if here the support for our expectations is 
less clear-cut.  
More specifically, although Asia is the EU‟s leading trade partner and the region with 
highest GDP in the world, it is not as active as North American and extra-EU European 
interests. Yet, the sub-regions and states within Asia which are trading mostly with the 
EU and in possession of the highest GDP level are also the ones that are contributing 
mostly. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of increased participation in online 
consultations over time due to increasing familiarity with EU practices. Instead, 
participation rates fluctuate and vary between the five regions. In contrast, we find some 
support for our fourth expectation that differences in national-sectoral structures 
between regions may affect the character of interest representation. While banking, 
finance and trade issue appear to matter in all regions, their importance differs. As a 
whole, a relatively diverse range of policy fields attracts participation in the different 
regions. In Asia, for example, transport and environment have received a high degree of 
attention. When it comes to looking at types of actors, we see that in Asia, just like in 
North America and Africa, private companies are the most active actors. However, in 
other regions this picture is different and high participation of public bodies from a few 
particular countries both in Asia and in some other regions can be seen. As expected, 
Asia is also unique in its high relative share of business-related interest groups. 
Overall, our framework proved useful in understanding the levels of engagement of 
Asian interests in EU consultations. Future research should expand this in two ways. 
First, additional factors that may impact the level of participation should be considered. 
We have already pointed to factors such as political culture, development of civil society, 
level of state versus private ownership and human rights. However, data gathering on 
this point is, as we already emphasised, far from easy. Despite such measurement 
problems, however, we believe that such an exercise would be worthwhile as it might 
help us account for some of the unexplained variation discussed in this article. Second, 
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future studies should expand on our research by looking at the involvement of Asian 
actors in types of EU policy making beyond online consultations. As already mentioned, 
consultations are only one type of engagement. To get a complete picture we would 
therefore need to compare it with other types of participation, such as informal lobbying 
of the EU institutions or participation in expert committees. In doing this our 
framework could be tested in a much broader range of settings than was possible with 
the online consultations, and we could further increase our understanding of the 
behaviour of non-EU interest groups in the policy drafting in Brussels.  
 
